Categorie actueel

HR-Café 15 november 2018: Hoe voorkomt u dat een ontslag onnodig veel geld kost?

HR-Café 15 november 2018: Hoe voorkomt u dat een ontslag onnodig veel geld kost? 1508 1007 Ekelmans Advocaten
HR cafe functioneren corona
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Op donderdag 15 november a.s. organiseert het Team Arbeidrecht van Ekelmans & Meijer Advocaten een HR-Café voor HR-professionals. In het HR-Café geven we u een interactieve update over een actueel HR-thema én bieden we HR-professionals de gelegenheid om hun ‘peers’ in een informele en kleinschalige setting te ontmoeten en ervaringen uit te wisselen. Gegarandeerd: een a-typische bijeenkomst die méér biedt dan alleen vaktechnische support.

Thema: Hoe voorkomt u dat een ontslag onnodig veel geld kost?

Dat je als werkgever sinds 1 juli 2015 bij ontslag in de regel een transitievergoeding moet betalen, zal u ongetwijfeld bekend zijn. Minder bekend is de billijke vergoeding. De billijke vergoeding is een additionele vergoeding die je als werkgever moet betalen wanneer je “ernstig verwijtbaar” hebt gehandeld. De billijke vergoeding is niet gemaximeerd en deze kan dus flink oplopen. De Rechtbank Noord-Holland heeft onlangs een billijke vergoeding toegekend van maar liefst € 628.000 bruto.

Wanneer is nu precies sprake van ernstig verwijtbaar handelen? En, hoe moet je de billijke vergoeding berekenen? Aan de hand van recente rechtspraak en een onderzoek uitgevoerd door het Hugo Sinzheimer Instituut van de Universiteit van Amsterdam zullen we deze en aanverwante vragen voor u beantwoorden in het komende HR-Café. Aan de hand van concrete voorbeelden geven we u tot slot ook tips over hoe u betaling van de billijke vergoeding kan voorkomen.

Programma

15:15 Inloop
15:30 Start HR-Café
17:15 Einde met borrel

Locatie

Anna van Saksenlaan 30
2593 HT Den Haag
T 070 – 374 64 10

Heeft u in uw netwerk een andere HR-professional die geïnteresseerd is in dit HR-Café, dan kunt u die uiteraard meenemen. Vanwege de beoogde kleinschaligheid geldt: wie het eerst komt, ….etc.

Wilt u meer informatie over ons HR-Café? Neem dan contact op met team Arbeidsrecht.

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The Dutch Supreme Court on the expected or intended injuries exclusion under the general liability insurance

The Dutch Supreme Court on the expected or intended injuries exclusion under the general liability insurance 2560 1707 Ekelmans Advocaten
injuries exclusion
Leestijd: 6 minuten
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The Dutch Supreme Court on the expected or intended injuries exclusion under the general liability insurance : “a reasonable and socially acceptable result”.

In a recent case,[1] the Dutch Supreme Court handed down a judgement regarding a liability claim on behalf of an infant against his father for bodily harm caused as a result of “shaken baby syndrome”.

The claimant was severely shaken by his father as a baby. As a result he suffered severe physical injuries. The father was prosecuted for attempted manslaughter, aggravated assault and causing severe physical injuries due to fault. In appeal the father was only convicted for causing severe physical injuries due to fault. The court of appeal concluded that there was no evidence for (conditional) criminal intent as required for a conviction on the count of attempted manslaughter and/or aggravated assault. However, the court did find that the father had been significantly careless. Furthermore, the court ruled that it is common knowledge that severely shaking a baby can lead to serious injuries, hence the conviction for causing severe physical injury. The court also took in account that the father has severely diminished capacity – and thus diminished responsibility – due to Asperger’s syndrome.

The father and his liability insurer are sued in civil court for damages suffered by the son.[2] The case against the father is straightforward but without insurance coverage it is unlikely the damages can be recovered. The insurer denies coverage based on the exclusion for expected or intended injury by the insured. The clause states:

“The liability of an insured person for damage caused by and / or resulting from his / her intentional and unlawful act against an individual or object is not covered.”

The lower courts

The liability insurer argues that the required intent refers to the unlawful. In this case, the “unlawful action” is the shaking of the baby. It’s not in question that the father intentionally shaked his son. Whether he intended the consequences as they occurred is therefore not relevant.

Both the court of first instance and the appeal court reject this view. Decisive in their ruling is the fact that in the criminal case the court ruled that the father did not act with intent or conditional intent but that he was (merely) significantly careless. In both instances the courts rule that the exclusion for expected or intended injury only applies to intent or conditional intent. According to the Court of Appeal neither the wording of the clause nor the explanatory notes provided by the Union of Insurers (Verbond van Verzekeraars) at the time of the introduction of the clause, support the view of the liability insurer.

The Supreme Court

The Supreme Court first determines that provisions such as the one in contention are (usually) not negotiated by the parties to the contract of insurance. Therefore, the provision should be interpreted relying on (mostly) objective factors such as the wording of the provision itself, placed in the context of the applicable terms and conditions as a whole and in accordance with the explanatory notes (if there are any).

Applying this standard, the Supreme Court finds that the insurer rightly argues that the wording of the clause stipulate that the required intent refers to the unlawful action and not whether the occurrence of the consequences were intended. However, the Supreme Court also notes that the examples set out in the explanatory notes, illustrate that in practice it can be difficult to distinguish between intent regarding the (unlawful) action and intent regarding the occurrence of the consequences of the action. Considering that the provision in question is widely used in Dutch general liability policies, the Supreme Court finds it prudent to offer the following viewpoints how to distinguish between the two.

The Supreme Court notes that injuries and/or damages of a kind and seriousness on which the intent of the insured was not aimed, can fall under the exclusion of expected or intended injury. This is the case if, taking the nature of the conduct and the circumstances under which it was carried out in consideration, the actual injuries or damages to property can be regarded, according to objective standards, as an expected or normal consequence of the relevant conduct. In such a case, it must be assumed that the behaviour of the insured person was aimed at causing the actual injuries or property damage, even if this type or severity of injury or property damage was not intended by the insured.

On the other hand, it cannot be said that the action of the insured was aimed at the occurrence of injury or property damage of a kind or seriousness which, according to objective standards, cannot be regarded as an expected or normal consequence of the conduct in question.

So the Supreme Court comes to the interim conclusion that in principle, the exclusion for expected or intended injury is applicable in case of a deliberate and unlawful conduct on the part of the insured that is objectively aimed at causing injury or property damage, and in which the injuries actually caused or the loss of property by objective standards can be regarded as an expected or normal consequence of the conduct in question.

Based on the finding of the lower courts – that it is common knowledge that the severe shaking of babies can lead to serious injury – this does not bode well for the claimant.

However, the Supreme Court then considers the pivotal social (public) function of the general liability insurance regarding the protection it offers victims; without insurance coverage the damages are usually unrecoverable and victims would remain empty handed. The Supreme Court emphasizes that the goal of protection of victims is expressly mentioned in the explanatory notes provided by the Union of Insurers. However the explanatory notes also state explicitly that it is highly undesirable that criminal behaviour is covered under the general liability insurance policy. The Supreme Court concludes that the explanatory notes thus require the balancing of these two conflicting principles in a tailored approach in order to reach “reasonable and socially acceptable results”.

This leads the Supreme Court to consider that even in cases where prima facie the exclusion for expected or intended injury clause seems applicable, the clause can be set aside due to the special circumstances of the case in order to reach “reasonable and socially acceptable results”. The special circumstances to be taken in to account are (amongst others):

(i) the nature of the unlawful conduct of the insured;
(ii) the circumstances in which it was performed;
(iii) the extent to which the insured can be blamed for his conduct or other subjective circumstances on his part;
(iv) and the nature and seriousness of the harmful consequences;
(v) as well as the scope and social significance of the general liability insurance.

In the end, the Supreme Court rules in favour of the claimant. It finds that in itself the shaking of the baby is deliberate behaviour, which was directed against a person with the expected consequence severe physical injuries. So the application of the exclusion for expected or intended injuries clause seems indicated. On the other hand the Supreme Court notes that, according to the appeal court findings, the father only had the intention to stop the baby’s crying and did not realize the improper or unlawful nature of his actions. Furthermore, the Supreme Court finds it relevant that the father has severely reduced accountability due to Asperger Syndrome. These circumstances – seen in the light of the social function of the general liability insurance –, lead the Supreme Court to conclude that the expected or intended injury exclusion in this particular case must remain inapplicable.

The Supreme Court thus comes to its desired reasonable and socially acceptable result. In doing so, the Supreme Court opens the door to new procedures to test the boundaries of the special circumstances exception on the applicability of the clause. Presumably other victims of criminal behaviour who, in the absence of coverage under a general liability insurance cannot (fully) recover their substantial damages, will try to rely on this case to try and circumvent the expected or intended injuries exclusion.

It will be interesting to see if the Union of Insurers will try to rephrase the clause and/or the explanatory notes to try to counter the victim-friendly interpretation favoured by the Supreme Court.

[1] Dutch Supreme Court, 13 April 2018, ECLI:NL:HR:2018:601
[2] Under Dutch law, a liability insurer can be sued directly by the victim in case of bodily injury.

Bron: Insurance Law Global

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Ekelmans & Meijer begeleidt doorstart Mooy Logistics

Ekelmans & Meijer begeleidt doorstart Mooy Logistics 1000 465 Ekelmans Advocaten
Mooy Logistics
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Transportbedrijf Mooy Logistics, een van de grootste transport ondernemingen van Nederland, maakt een doorstart. Mooy Logistics ging medio augustus failliet en wordt nu opgedeeld en voortgezet door twee afzonderlijke bedrijven.

Het grootste deel van de activiteiten van Mooy wordt overgenomen door het Oostenrijkse Gartner. Gartner, een van de grootste transportondernemingen in Europa, maakt een doorstart met de vestiging van Mooy Logistics te Waddinxveen. Ekelmans & Meijer begeleidde de deal voor het Oostenrijkse Gartner. Een team van advocaten bestaande uit Eckhard Mehring, Robert Kütemann en Daan Spoormans maakte de doorstart binnen 2,5 dag mogelijk.

Op onder meer www.logistiek.nl is aandacht besteed aan de deal.

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Dutch Supreme Court: no loss of claim in case of fraud committed against the insurer by a third party victim

Dutch Supreme Court: no loss of claim in case of fraud committed against the insurer by a third party victim 2560 1707 Ekelmans Advocaten
fraud against insurer
Leestijd: 4 minuten
Lesedauer: 4 Minuten
Reading time: 4 minutes

Introduction

On 6 July 2018 the Dutch Supreme Court gave a fundamental decision on the consequences of fraud committed by a third party victim against the insurer of the liable party.[1] For years the big question was whether the statutory sanction on fraud for insured parties could be extrapolated to cases where a third party victim committed the fraud against the insurer.

Legal literature and case law were divided on this question. Some considered the lack of a contractual relationship uberrimae fidei (“of utmost good faith”) as an obstacle for analogous application of the statutory sanction to the relationship between a third party victim and the insurer. Others argued that the insurer is just as dependent on the claimant for the provision of reliable information in case of a third party claim as in case of a claim by the insured.

Direct claim against the insurer

In the Netherlands, as in other EU member states, drivers are obliged to have motor liability insurance. Victims of car accidents do not have to claim damages with the liable driver but have a direct claim against his/her motor liability insurer. This direct claim has its basis in EU regulation and is therefore also seen in other EU member states.

Facts of the case: was the alleged victim in the car?

In the case before the Supreme Court the victim also aimed its claim for damages directly at the motor liability insurer of the liable party. The case concerns a car accident that took place in the fall of 2001.

The victim was the mother of one of the drivers involved. She claimed to be a passenger at the time of the accident. The mother, who already suffered from health problems before the accident, had visited her doctor the day after the accident with whiplash symptoms. As from 2002, a few months after the incident, she was declared fully unfit for work.

The motor liability insurer of the liable driver refused to pay damages to the mother as the liable driver contested that the mother was in the car at the moment of the accident. In response to the insurer’s refusal of the claim, the mother produced several false witness statements. During the proceedings before the court of first instance the falseness of the witness statements came to light. The mother and some of the witnesses were convicted by the criminal court for forgery of documents, fraud and/or perjury.

Lower courts

The court of first instance dealing with the mother’s claim for damages denied the claim. The court of appeal however, granted the claim.

The court of appeal disregarded the false witness statements but found on the basis of other means of proof that the mother was a passenger at the time of the accident. These means of proof were all derived from the mother’s own assertion that she was a passenger.

The insurer brought the case before the Supreme Court, claiming that the court of appeal had wrongly denied the legal principle that a claim is denied if the third party has misled the insurer in order to obtain payment. Alternatively, the insurer claimed that the court of appeal did not give a proper ruling on the evidence of the case.

Relevant provision(s)

With its claim for a total loss of claim by the victim, the insurer refers to article 7:941 paragraph 5 of the Dutch Civil Code. This provision denies insureds the right to payment if they fail to timely notify their insurer of a claim and/or fail to provide (proper) information to the insurer in a deliberate attempt to mislead said insurer. Strictly speaking, the provision only applies in the contractual relationship between the insurer and the insured. However, the insurer in this case claimed, in line with case law of the Dutch Financial Services Complaints Tribunal and several legal authors, that the provision should be analogously applied to the relationship with a third party.

Supreme Court judgment

The Supreme Court does not concur with the position taken by the insurer. The Supreme Court rules that there is no room for analogous application of the sanction outside the relationship between the insurer and the insured, i.e. in the relationship between the insurer and a third party victim. The sanction of article 7:941 paragraph 5 DCC is justified by the character of confidence of the insurance agreement. The Supreme Court finds that said sanction does not distinguish between severe fraud cases and less severe fraud cases which makes the sanction a drastic one. Therefore, said sanction cannot be accepted in other relationships without a statutory basis.

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court rules the judgment of the court of appeal to be incomprehensible. The Supreme Court has difficulties with the finding of the court that the mother has succeeded in proving that she was a passenger at the time of the accident. Therefore, the judgment of the court of appeal is set aside. The Supreme Court refers the case back to another court of appeal for further handling.

Take away: fraud is never without consequence

The latter findings of the Supreme Court show that fraud by a third party victim also comes with consequences, however less drastic ones. In line with the opponents of analogous application of the aforementioned sanction, the Supreme Court deals with fraud committed by third parties by setting higher requirements for the evidence produced by the fraudster.

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David de Knijff in de Telegraaf

David de Knijff in de Telegraaf 1900 1357 Ekelmans Advocaten
David de Knijff-Ekelmans Advocaten
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Ter gelegenheid van de Franse feestdag 14 juli waren prominenten uit het Haagse uitgenodigd op de Franse Ambassade. David de Knijff, advocaat en partner Ekelmans & Meijer Advocaten, was ook aanwezig.

De Telegraaf was erbij voor interviews en foto’s van bekende Haagse gasten. Met David is een kort interview gehouden over zijn aftreden als deken. David is inmiddels weer werkzaam als advocaat in zijn proces- en cassatiepraktijk.

Klik hier onder voor het artikel.

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Een digitale uitspraak én een papieren grosse

Een digitale uitspraak én een papieren grosse 1900 1357 Ekelmans Advocaten
Marieke van der Keur-Ekelmans Advocaten
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Het nieuwe KEI-Rv maakt het mogelijk dat een digitale uitspraak wordt gewezen. Daarnaast kan ook nog een papieren grosse worden afgegeven. In dit artikel komt aan de orde wanneer een procespartij nog aanspraak maakt op een papieren grosse. En: hoe verhoudt deze papieren grosse zich tot de digitale uitspraak?

Marieke van der Keur, advocaat bij de sectie Cassatie besteedt in het bijzonder aandacht aan de gang van zaken in de civiele cassatie-praktijk. Daar wordt al sinds maart 2017 in civiele vorderingszaken volledig digitaal geprocedeerd.

Lees hier onder het volledige artikel.

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Ekelmans Advocaten begeleidt overname van fotonicabedrijf Lionix door Magic Micro

Ekelmans Advocaten begeleidt overname van fotonicabedrijf Lionix door Magic Micro 1500 1000 Ekelmans Advocaten
Adriaan de Buck overnames
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Expertise:

LioniX International, een hightech fotonicabedrijf uit Enschede, komt voor 75% in handen van de Zuid-Koreaanse beursgenoteerde onderneming Magic Micro, producent van led- en elektronische componenten. Het Corporate team van Ekelmans Advocaten heeft Magic Micro bij de acquisitie geadviseerd.

Fotonica is een hoogwaardige technologie uit de optica waarmee licht voor allerlei doeleinden kan worden gebruikt. Nederland geldt als koploper op het gebied van deze techniek. Met het extra kapitaal dat LioniX International krijgt met deze overname kan het zijn strategie verder uitvoeren.

Het FD berichtte op 5 juli over deze transactie.

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David de Knijff Best Lawyer in de categorie Litigation

David de Knijff Best Lawyer in de categorie Litigation 1900 1357 Ekelmans Advocaten
David de Knijff-Ekelmans Advocaten
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De lijst Best Lawyers heeft David de Knijff, partner Cassatie bij Ekelmans & Meijer, opgenomen als Best Lawyer in de categorie Litigation. David de Knijff is gespecialiseerd in cassatiezaken. Regelmatig adviseert hij advocaten bij complexe procesrechtelijke vragen.

Sinds 1981 wordt de Best Lawyers lijst gemaakt op basis van nominaties en reviews van advocaten door hun peers. De van oorsprong Amerikaanse lijst wordt inmiddels in meer dan 70 landen gemaakt en gepubliceerd. De lijst wordt samengesteld doordat advocaten hun mede advocaten kunnen nomineren. Op basis van stemmen door peers krijgen de nominaties met het hoogste aantal stemmen een plek op de lijst. Bekijk via deze link de Nederlandse editie.

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Enforcement of the GDPR

Enforcement of the GDPR 1000 465 Ekelmans Advocaten
Enforcement GDPR
Leestijd: 4 minuten
Lesedauer: 4 Minuten
Reading time: 4 minutes
Expertise:

As generally known, on 25 may 2018 the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) came into effect. This Regulation conferres the national Data protection authorities to impose hefty fines (up to 20 million euro or 4% of the annual worldwide turnover). In addition, citizens can file a complaint at the national Data protection authority.

Lack of strength

This change in regulation creates a great amount of work for the Data protection authorities. At the meantime, in the Netherlands the capacity to implement the new legislation is seriously doubted.

Although the organisation of the Dutch data protection authority grew from 72 employers to 123, the envisaged growth to 140 employers was not achieved.[1] Furthermore, a number of important people left the organisation. Moreover there would be a good deal of dissatisfaction within the organisation.[2] To mitigate and avoid further turbulences the executive board will soon be extended with a third member.[3] As a consequence of all these circumstances, a lack of authority of the national Data protection authority is presumed.

Differences in points of view between the Dutch Government and the Dutch data protection authority

Furthermore, the request for extra finance of the Data protection authority has also been denied by the responsible Dutch Minister of Justice. The Minister has indicated that no extra money will be provided until “the dust settles”.[4]

Money however is certainly not the only subject of discussion between the Minister of Justice and the Dutch data protection authority. Shortly before the GDPR entered into force the Minister of Justice reassured small and medium-sized enterprises that they should not fear immediate penalties if not GDPR-compliant: ”If you are working on it, the Dutch data protection authority will not be knocking on your front door on de 26 th.[5]

All much to the displeasure of the Dutch data protection authority, that in response to this pronouncement made clear that not the Minister but only the authority is responsible for the enforcement of the legislation and that every organisation, big or small, needs to comply with the Regulation. [6]

Other European countries also inadequately prepared

The Netherlands are not the only European Member State where the ability of the Data protection Authority to respond effectively to violations of the GDPR is questioned.
According to a survey by the press agency Reuters, 17 of the 24 National authorities noted that they did not yet have sufficient financial resources, or at the time of entry did not have sufficient powers to fully carry out the new Regulation. Most of the Member States were even now still required to adjust their national laws. Only 5 of the 24 national Authorities were able to confirm that they have both the sufficient financial resources and the assets to be able to act adequately.[7]

Dutch Insurance Industry in forefront with new Privacy Code of Conduct

Dutch Insurers and foreign insurers operating in the Netherlands however in general have taken significant measures in order to achieve a compliant operation.
In addition, the Dutch Association of Insurers, the sector organisation for the insurance industry, has also acted progressively by drawing up a new Privacy Code of Conduct, the so called “Gedragscode Verwerking Persoonsgegevens Verzekeraars”, which is grafted onto the GDPR and will be submitted for approval to all the Insurers affiliated at the General Members’ Meeting on 20 June 2018.
This Code of Conduct replaces the previous code that was obsolete, partly in view of the both new and advanced technologies in the use of personal data. In case of an affirmative vote by a majority of the Members, this Code of Conduct for insurers will acquire the status of binding self-regulation. Authorised brokers and intermediaries may also choose to commit to the Code of Conduct.
In the Code of Conduct the GDPR is translated into a set of concrete rules for the insurance industry. Important topics are the large-scale analysis of personal data by insurers for determining the premium, and the processing of personal data for the safety and integrity of the sector. The Code of Conduct has not yet been certified in the sense of art. 40 GDPR, because further detailed Directives of the European supervisors are still being prepared.

The implementation of the GDPR in the Netherlands has thus been approached at a sector wide level. The scarce enforcement capacity of the Dutch data protection authority is therefore not expected to be primarily aimed at insurers. Or, as the Dutch data protection authority in an interview with the Dutch Association of Insurers stated: “I do not worry so much about insurers. I have the impression that the sector is well organized.”

[1] “Privacy watchdog with big plans and tight budget”, De Volkskrant, 24 may 2018

[2] “Unrest with privacy watchdog Authority Personal Data”, Het Financieele Dagblad and “Administrative disputes limit authority to the Personal Data Authority”, NOS, 25 mei 2018.

[3] “Dekker is looking for third board member of the Authority for Personal Data”, Het Financieele Dagblad

[4] “Dekker:” not immediately fine for football club due to new privacy law, NOS, 24 mei 2018.

[5] “Minister Dekker: Smaller organizations do not have to expect immediate penalties by AVG”, Algemeen Dagblad, 24 mei 2018.

[6] “Minister speaks in turn about enforcement of privacy law”Het Financieele Dagblad

[7] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-privacy-analysis/european-regulators-were-not-ready-for-new-privacy-law-idUSKBN1I915X

Auteur

De Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens loopt zich warm

De Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens loopt zich warm 1000 465 Ekelmans Advocaten
AP loopt zich warm
Leestijd: 2 minuten
Lesedauer: 2 Minuten
Reading time: 2 minutes
Expertise:

In de afgelopen periode heeft de Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens bij ruim 400 overheidsorganisaties gecontroleerd of zij hebben voldaan aan de verplichting tot het aanstellen van een Functionaris voor de Gegevensbescherming (FG). Gebleken is dat een kleine 4% nog niet aan deze verplichting uit de nieuwe Europese Privacywet (AVG) voldoet. Deze organisaties zijn aangeschreven en moeten voor 11 juni 2018 alsnog aan de AP laten weten wie hun FG is. Doen zij dit niet, dan kan een sanctie worden opgelegd.

Wanneer is een FG verplicht?

Art. 37 van de AVG stelt een FG verplicht voor:

  • overheden en publieke organisaties (rijksoverheid, gemeenten en provincies, maar ook zorg- en onderwijsinstellingen), ongeacht het type gegevens dat zij verwerken. Voor rechtbanken geldt de verplichte aanstelling van een FG niet.
  • organisaties die als kernactiviteit op grote schaal individuen volgen of diens activiteiten in kaart brengen (bijvoorbeeld door profiling, cameratoezicht of personeelvolgsystemen).
  • organisaties die als kernactiviteit op grote schaal bijzondere persoonsgegevens verwerken (zoals gezondheidsgegevens en gegevens over ras, politieke opvatting, geloofsovertuiging, seksuele geaardheid of strafrechtelijk verleden)

Waaraan moet een aanmelding FG voldoen?

FG-aanmeldingen moeten via een speciaal op de website van de AP opgenomen “aanmeldingsformulier functionaris voor de gegevensbescherming (FG)” bij de AP worden gedaan.

Let op: eerdere FG-aanmeldingen waarvoor niet dit speciale webformulier van de AP is gebruikt zijn per 25 mei 2018 vervallen. Ook een vrijwillig aangestelde FG moet met dit webfomulier worden aangemeld.

Doorstaat úw bedrijf de toets?

Inmiddels heeft de AP als volgende stap aangekondigd in de private sector tot controle van FG-aanmeldingen over te gaan.

Het is dus aanbevolen binnen uw organisatie niet alleen na te gaan of aan de verplichting tot het aanmelden van de FG is voldaan, maar ook of dit met het door de AP voorgeschreven webformulier is gebeurd.

Mocht u nog vragen hebben over dit onderwerp, dan kunt u contact opnemen met Astrid van Noort.

Auteur

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